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Abstract:
Experiments suggest that communication increases the contribution to public goods
(Ledyard, 1995). There is also evidence that, when contemplating a lie, people trade off
their private benefit from the lie with the harm it inflicts on others (Gneezy, 2005). We
develop a theory of bilateral pre-play negotiation that assumes the latter and implies the
former (alternatively we can interpret the agreement as a convention). A preference for not
lying (transgressing conventions) provides a partial commitment device that enables
informal agreements. We establish some general properties of the set of possible
agreements and characterize the smallest and largest such set. In symmetric games, pre-
play agreements crucially depend on whether actions are strategic complements or
substitutes. With strategic substitutes, commitment power tends to decrease in efficiency
whereas the opposite may be true with strategic complements. Also this finding is
supported by experimental evidence.
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There is no commonly honest man ...who does not inwardly feel the truth of the great stoical
maxim, that for one man to deprive another unjustly to promote his own advantage by the loss or
the disadvantage of the another, is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain,
than all the misfortunes which can a¤ect him, either his body, or his external circumstances.
-Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 159, 2002 (1759))
1 Introduction
Ray and Cal have a magic pot and ten dollars each. Each dollar put into the
pot gives 34 dollars to both of them. Ray and Cal have to decide how many
dollars to put into the pot and how many to keep to themselves. Ray …gures
that, whatever Cal puts into the pot, for each dollar he puts into the pot, he
gets only 3
4
dollars back and, hence, should put nothing into the pot.
Before they decide, they can talk to each other. They may agree on how
many dollars each of them will put into the pot. The agreement is not binding.
Yet, having talked to Cal for a while, he seems like a nice guy to Ray. Ray
starts to think that he would feel bad if he lied about how many dollars he
will put into the pot. He also …gures that Cal may well think similarly about
him. Eventually, Ray and Cal agree on putting ten dollars each into the pot
and neither violates the agreement.
Most people would think that the story above is vaguely plausible but doubt
that such magic pots exist. An economist is certain about the existence of the
magic pot, but has doubts whether people care about in‡icting harm on the
other by not doing as agreed.
Two …ndings in experimental economics give a reason to believe that the
magic pots and the dislike to breach oral agreements are worth taking seriously:
First, communication increases contributions in public good games1 . Second,
if people lie, they tend to dislike it; and the more harm they in‡ict on others
by doing so, the more they seem to dislike it. This is shown by Gneezy (2005)
and by several studies in social psychology. In public good games, agreeing
to contribute more than one actually intends to contribute amounts to a lie
which harms others. Thus, a theory that assumes the latter …nding provides an
explanation for the former …nding.
Pre-play agreements by mutual consent provide a means to establish com-
monly known expectations about each others behavior. Having justi…ed expec-
tations of each others behvaior, players dislike letting down the opponent if the
opponent does not. Aversion for letting down opponent’s expectations is studied
experimentally and theoretically by Dufwenberg and his co-authors in several
papers. In this paper, we argue that for let-down aversion to emerge, the ex-
pectations must satisfy three criteria: they must be 1) coinciding, 2) commonly
known and 3) justi…ed. We argue that conventions and pre-play agreements are
1See Ledyard (1995) for a review of experimental research on public goods. This result
holds for public good games without a threshold. The evidence that communication would
increase contributions in public good games with thresholds is more mixed -the increase in
contributions is not always signi…cant.
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natural devices that generate mutual expectations satisfying these criteria. We
present a tractable model of let down aversion which takes into account these
features.
In the model, the more players dislike breaching agreements the more harm
they in‡ict on others by doing so. We show that in symmetric games with strate-
gic substitutes such as the public good provision with a decreasing returns to
scale technology, or the Cournot duopoly, there is a con‡ict between the e¢-
ciency of the agreement and the incentives to respect it. On the other hand, in
an important class of symmetric games where actions are (weak) strategic com-
plements (Bulow, Roberts and Klemperer, 1985), such con‡ict is circumvented:
a symmetric e¢cient agreement can be made, if any. This class includes the
public good provision game with constant returns to scale production technol-
ogy and other team work and parnership designs as well as Bertrand duopolies
with imperfect substitutes.
Public good experiments with communication lend strong support for our
theory: Isaac and Walker (1988) adopt a constant returns to scale technology
and …nd a strong positive e¤ect of communication on e¢ciency. Average contri-
bution levels are practically …rst-best e¢cient. Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985)
adopt a decreasing returns to scale production technology. Despite the positive
e¤ect of communication on e¢ciency, they …nd that the average contribution
levels are well below …rst-best e¢cient2 .
Our theory considers bilateral agreements in a wide array of strategic two-
player interactions. The underlying game, the game that is played when an
agreement is established, can be any normal form game. We assign the guilt
cost properties that experimental and narrative research in economics and psy-
chology has discovered. We assume that the general principles that govern guilt
are the same for all players. Players may di¤er only in their proneness to guilt,
i.e. how much weight they put on the guilt cost. We abstract from how an
ageement is established (in pre-play negotiations, the negotiation protocol) but
assume that the agreement is either an action pro…le of the underlying game
or disagreement. Having an agreement on a pro…le, a player who breaches may
feel guilty, which lowers her utility.
Given a game and players’proneness to guilt, each agreement maps the
game into another game with the same strategy sets, but di¤erent payo¤s. We
are interested in which action pro…les are agreeable, which action pro…les can
be enforced by guilt. Also, we are interested in how agreeability is a¤ected
by changes in (1) the underlying game, (2) the agreement, and (3) players’
proneness to guilt.
Agreeability is de…ned in terms of incentive compatibility. An action pro…le
is incentive compatible if neither player prefers breaching. That is, for any
unilateral deviation from the pro…le, the guilt cost is larger than or equal to the
underlying game bene…t for the deviator. We call the di¤erence between the
2These two studies are the only one’s that allow subjects to play repeatedly and learn
about the game. Actually, Isaac and Walker (1988) have one design with constant returns to
scale technology and another with decreasing returns to scale technology. With the former
design, …rst best e¢ciency is reached whereas the latter falls short of …rst best.
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underlying game bene…t and the guilt cost the incentive to breach.
Which agreements are agreeable will depend crucially on the properties of
the guilt cost. We adopt the following properties, which are based on stylized
facts in research in social psychology and experimental economics3:
{A} Guilt costs are weakly increasing in the harm a player in‡icts on his op-
ponent by breaching an agreement.
{B} If the opponent breaches, then there is no guilt cost.
{C} Guilt costs are weakly increasing in the player’s agreed payo¤.
{D} If no agreement is reached, there is no guilt cost.
Property {A} captures the idea that if my breaching the agreement causes
my opponent to lose a toe, I do not su¤er more than if my breaching the agree-
ment causes my opponent to lose a leg. Gneezy (2005) …nds strong support
for property {A}: his experiments suggest that people trade o¤ the bene…ts of
lying against the harm that lying in‡icts on the opponent. Property {B} is a
no-sucker property: I will not feel guilty about breaching an agreement if my op-
ponent breaches the agreement, too. According to property {C} the agreement’s
generosity induce stronger guilt. In pre-play negotiations, since there is guilt
only if the opponent does not breach the agreement, the fact that the opponent
respects and the fact that the agreed payo¤ is high indicate that the opponent is
kind and generous. Hence, breaching the agreement and not reciprocating this
will induce stronger guilt than if the agreement had been less generous. In the
context of conventions, this e¤ect may be weaker but even there a player may
be more willing to breach a convention she considers unjusti…ed. Properties {B}
and {C} render guilt reciprocal. They also emphasize the idea that players are
less willing to let down justi…ed expectations. Property {D} expresses the idea
that if the expectations do not coincide -there is no agreement, there is no guilt
of breaching.
If the agreement is established by pre-play negotiations, it is natural to
think that each player can veto any agreement. We say that an action pro…le
is individually rational if it ensures that each player gets more than in her least
preferred Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. In pre-play negotiations,
upon deciding whether to signal disagreement, each player acts as if she knew
that doing so will imply coordination on her worst Nash equilibrium.
Crucial for our …nding in games with strategic complements and substitutes
and an interesting result in its own right is that, in games where actions are
ordered and the payo¤ is concave in each of the two actions, checking that a mar-
ginal deviation from the agreement does not pay o¤ is necessary and su¢cient
for incentive compatibility.
Further towards our main conclusion, we …nd unambiguous e¤ects on the
incentive to breach when the terms of the agreement are altered (if the agreement
3 In addition to their intuitive appeal, we present experimental evidence and psychological
theory that supports these assumptions in section 2.
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is agreeable in the …rst place): in symmetric games with strategic complements,
changing either agreed action so as to improve a player’s agreed payo¤ decreases
her marginal incentive to breach. These e¤ects are quite natural and intuitive: if
the terms of the agreement are better for me, I have a lower incentive to breach.
Yet, the result does not hold generally.
In symmetric games with strategic substitutes ; as far as changes in player’s
own action are concerned, the player’s payo¤ and her incentives to respect agree-
ments are still naturally aligned. Yet, changing the opponent’s agreed action
implies quite the opposite e¤ect: the marginal bene…t increases and the mar-
ginal harm on the opponent decreases when the opponent’s action is changed
so as to improve player’s payo¤. This is the source of our result, identifying
a con‡ict between e¢ciency and incentives in symmetric games with strategic
substitutes, such as the standard Cournot duopoly or public good provision with
a decreasing returns to scale production technology.
We also describe the agreeable set in a more general class of games and char-
acterize the smallest and largest such set: Nash equilibria are always agreeable
and nothing but Nash equilibria are agreeable for players with no proneness to
guilt. Yet, a player who is su¢ciently prone to guilt can agree on any individ-
ually rational pro…le that she cannot alone Pareto-improve and strictly bene…t
herself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related literature in
economics and psychology. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies a
public good game. Section 5 presents general results and section 6 studies games
with ordered strategy spaces. Section 7 considers a Cournot duopoly example.
Section 8 concludes and discusses some further research problems.
2 Related literature
Economics. Evidence from experiments in public good games shows that even
without communication subjects contribute positive amounts when purely mon-
etary incentives make zero contribution a strictly dominant strategy. Existing
social preference models nicely capture this e¤ect. Yet, a largely unexplained
…nding is that communication raises the contributions well above the amounts
observed without communication (Ledyard, 1995). Earliest experiments show
this in prisoner’s dilemma games (Loomis,1959; Radlow and Weidner, 1966).
Recent studies for the two-person prisoner’s dilemma case are provided by Du¤y
and Feltowich (2002) and (2005)4 .
A way forward in explaining the e¤ect of communication is to combine one of
the inequity aversion theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000) with Farrell’s (1987) idea that agreements will be stuck by if there is
no incentive not to do so. Yet, this fusion of theories can only account for the
experimental …ndings as long as the payo¤s are not too asymmetric, since if they
4Extensions to public good provision games have been considered and the robustness of
this result is veri…ed by various experiments, for instance, Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee
(1977), Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985), and Isaac and Walker (1988)
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are, symmetric contribution pro…les lead to unequal payo¤s and players with
payo¤s below the average cannot commit to these pro…les. Even in symmetric
environments, if the more e¢cient symmetric equilibria exist in the underlying
game, the learning process never reaches these equilibria when communication
is not present and, yet, these outcomes are reached when communication is
allowed for (Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985); Isaac and Walker (1988)). Gneezy
(2005) and Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004), on the other hand, carrie out
further communication experiments and …nd behavioral patterns that cannot
be explained by inequity aversion theories alone but which point to a preference
for not lying.
The extensive form extension of Rabin’s (1993) theory of reciprocity as intro-
duced by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is another candidate for capturing
the phenomenon. Nevertheless, Charness and Dufwenberg (2003) show that se-
quential reciprocity cannot fully account for the detected behavioral patterns
related to communication. They conclude that there must be a separate pref-
erence related to lying and introduce, independently of the contribution in this
paper, the guilt-aversion equilibrium, where a player su¤ers a cost when she
acts counter to the opponent’s expectation on her behavior5. In their model,
promising to carry out an action is assumed to strengthen the belief that the
opponent expects corresponding behavior, thereby creating further incentives to
behave accordingly. Nevertheless, the role of communication is only implicit in
their model. Furthermore, in their model, however unjusti…ed the opponent’s
expectation is, guilt is constant whenever the harm on the opponent is the same.
Our model can be considered as an enriched and tractable CD model. Players
dislike breaching an agreement only if she expects that the opponent does not act
counter to it and only if the expected behavior in the agreement treats the player
su¢ciently well. Further, we are explicit about the e¤ect of communication and
the agreement. This view is supported by experimental evidence: Lev-on (2005)
reviews communication experiments in public good games and concludes that
mere identi…cation or discussion which lacks explicit promising loses some of
its e¤ectiveness in supporting cooperation6. The model is general. It captures
many features of reciprocity, yet avoiding problems of tractability in models
where payo¤s depend on beliefs explicitly7 . The guilt in our model bases its
properties on research in social psychology and allows for most of the features
relevant to pre-play negotiations and conventions.
Guilt has been discussed in several papers since Frank (1988) who argues
5Thus, like the theories of reciprocity, the theory falls into the category of psychological
game theory (Geanokoplos, Pierce, and Stachetti 1989) where players’payo¤s depend on be-
liefs explicitely. See also Dufwenberg (2002). Our model can be considered as a tractable
model of let-down aversion where a player may be averse to act counter to a justi…ed expec-
tation. See Miettinen (2005).
6Furthermore, mere face-to-face identi…cation increases cooperation especially in simple
prisoner’s dilemma games where coordination on group optimum is easy (Bohnet and Frey
(1998)). Yet, cooperation rates are signi…cantly weaker than when interactive communication
is allowed for.
7Some feasible guilt cost functions imply that the preferences in the cases where an agree-
ment is in place are tractable social preferences of Cox and Friedman (2002).
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that it may well be materially pro…table for an agent to have a conscience -
a dislike for disobeying social norms. A recent model on emotional cost of
breaching social norms is provided by Huck, Kubler, and Weibull (2003). These
models involve no communication. Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004) do allow
for communication and study the interplay of inequity aversion and guilt in a
speci…c hold-up problem between a seller and a buyer. Their model is similar to
ours in that guilt does not depend on the beliefs explicitly. Also, guilt is su¤ered
if one breaches a promise. However, their model of guilt is simpler, since it does
not take into account the reciprocal elements of opponent’s behavior and it
assumes that breaching a promise in‡icts a constant guilt cost.
Psychology. In addition to their intuitive appeal, properties {A} to {D} are
supported by experimental evidence and by psychological theory. As to property
{A}, Ho¤man (1982) suggests that guilt has its roots in a distress response to
the su¤ering of others. The main empirical …nding of Gneezy (2005) is that 1)
lying is directly costly and 2) people do not care only about their own gain from
lying: they are also sensitive to the harm that lying may in‡ict on others.
As far as property {B} is concerned, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton
(1995) …nd that people feel more guilty about transgressions involving an ”es-
teemed”person than about transgressions involving someone they hold in low
regard. It is rather appealing to suppose that, if the opponent breaches the
agreement, the esteem of a player towards the opponent is smaller than if the
opponent respects. We go to an extreme and assume that the player does not
su¤er from guilt if the opponent breaches the agreement.
Property {C} operates together with property {B}: agreements that are
respected and give a high payo¤ to a player, signal opponent’s concern for
player’s welfare and such opponents are likely to be esteemed. According to
Clark and Mills (1984) and Clark (1979), concern for the other’s welfare is the
de…ning feature of communal relationships as opposed to exchange relationships.
According to Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1995), guilt is more likely
to arise in the former type than in the latter type of relationships.
So as to property {D}, an agreement or an action-norm explicitly states an
expectation and a standard of behavior for the play phase. Not reaching an
agreement indicates players’inability to establish such a standard and a shared
expectation. Millar and Tesser (1988) note that guilt depends on a concurrence
of one’s own expectations of behavior and those of the other person. Guilt
appears mainly when there is a match in expectations of behavior. Such a
match of expectations is established either by an exogenous action-norm or a
pre-play agreement to an action pro…le. On the other hand, some experimental
studies of the public good game show that a single message for not contributing
is su¢cient to make an agreement invalid.8 This body of research suggests
each player should have an ability to veto an agreement and that if there is
no agreement in place, guilt should be lower. We take this to an extreme and
assume that there is guilt only if there is an agreement or a commonly known
action-norm.
8See Ledyard (1995) and Pavitt and Shankar (2002).
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More generally, research in psychology identi…es three types of emotional
distress associated with lying: guilt, shame and fear of punishment. From a
game theoretical perspective, the latter two have a reputation and repetition
‡avor respectively whereas guilt may be su¤ered even if the act of lying is
unobservable and unveri…able to others, or the victim or a third party is in no
position to retaliate.
According to Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994), ”guilt can be
distinguished from fear of punishment on the basis that the distress pertains to
the action itself rather than to the expectation of hedonically aversive conse-
quences of the action. ...One can clearly feel guilt..., even if the victim is in no
position to retaliate.”
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) are concerned with what makes
people feel guilt and what that feeling, or the motivation to avoid that feeling,
causes them to do (p.245). They argue that:
-From an interpersonal perspective, the prototypical cause of guilt would be the in‡iction of
harm, loss, or distress on a relationship partner. Although guilt may begin with close relationships,
it is not con…ned to them; guilt proneness may become generalized to other relationships. ... In
particular, a well-socialized individual would presumably have learned to feel guilty over in‡icting
harm to even a stranger.
Based on this view, we elaborate on the idea of guilt as an internalized pun-
ishment payo¤ in a repeated game prior to which players agree on a stationary
pattern of play in the appendix.
In the present model, as in theories of fairness, players internalize the op-
ponent’s payo¤ but only conditional on reaching an agreement, conditional on
the opponent respecting the agreement and conditional on the opponent su¤ering
from breaching. Thus, the model shares some of the features of the models of
fairness but di¤ers from those in important dimensions.
3 The model
Let ¡ be a two-player simultaneous move normal form game; below referred to
as the underlying game.9 Before the game is played, an agreement -a mutual
expectation -is establihed either by pre-play negotiations or by convention.
Generally, the pre-play negotiations may have an arbitrary strategic structure
or the agreement may be exogenous -the only requirement is that there is an
agreement or disagreement on how to play 10 .
We rule out the use of mixed strategies in the underlying game. If we
allowed for mixed strategies, we should determine whether guilt is a function
of consequences only or whether guilt is felt even if a mixed strategy di¤erent
from the agreed one is chosen but the random draw picks up a pure strategy
that is in the support of the agreed mixed strategy11 .
9The theory allows for a straightforward extension to sequential two stage games.
10Preplay negotiation is a …nite extensive form game tree. The terminal histories are asso-
ciated with an oral (non-binding) agreement; or with disagreement:
11On the other hand, we could easily allow for correlated strategies where players agree on
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3.1 The underlying game
The two-player underlying game is given by ¡ = fSi; ui(s) : S ! Rg. The
action set of player i is Si: A combination of actions is an action pro…le s =
(si; sj) 2 S = Si £ Sj . The underlying game payo¤ of player i is ui(s). Notice
that this payo¤ may well include social preference terms.
The lowest Nash payo¤ of player i is de…ned by u¤i
:
= mins2NE(¡) ui(s)
where NE(¡) is the set of pure Nash equilibria in the underlying game. The
vector of such payo¤s is u¤ = (u¤i ; u
¤
j ). If rational players play without pre-play
negotiations and they have correct expectations about the behavior of the other,
then a Nash equilibrium should result. Thus, the lowest Nash payo¤ is the worst
case scenario if negotiations fail (and players believe in equilibrium play).
The negotiations or the convention establishes an agreement, m; on how to
play, or disagreement. Thus, we restrict m 2 S [ fdg where d denotes disagree-
ment. If m 2 S is the agreement, then m1 and m2 are the agreed actions of
players one and two respectively. The agreed payo¤ 12 indicates how much more
than u¤i the player gets if both respect the agreement, vi(m)
:
= ui(m) ¡ u¤i .
If player i deviates from the agreement, we get the harm on j by subtracting
j’s payo¤ at the deviation pro…le from the payo¤ at the agreed action pro-
…le, hj(m; si)
:
= uj(m) ¡ uj(mj; si). Similarly, i’s bene…t from breaching is
bi(m;si)
:
= ui(mj; si) ¡ ui(m).
In this paper, we restrict focus to simultaneous move games. Notice, that
we could easily extend our theory to corresponding Stackelberg games, say, with
player one the leader and player two the follower. That player one moves …rst
gives her perfect commitment power. If the leader breaches, the follower does
not su¤er from guilt and her payo¤ coincides with the UG payo¤. Thus, the
follower will choose an UG best reply to the leader’s action. In the Stackelberg
version of the theory, we should replace the worst Nash payo¤ with the worst
Stackelberg payo¤.
3.2 The entire game
Players are prone to guilt. If there is an agreement in place, they feel bad about
not doing their part of the deal. Player i’s guilt cost, gi(vi(m); hj(m;si)), depends
on the in‡icted harm and on the agreed payo¤. The utility function over the
action pro…les in the entire game is assumed to be additively separable in guilt
and the underlying game payo¤.
Ui(m;s) = ui(s) ¡ µig(vi(m); hj(m; si)) if si 6= mi ; sj = mj
ui(s) otherwise
(BD)
The entire game payo¤ now depends on m and, due to guilt, talk is not cheap.
The guilt cost is represented by µig(vi(m); hj(m; si)) which is assumed to be
a given random draw on how to play: guilt would be a function of the expected agreed payo¤.
12Most of our results would be unaltered if we alternatively suppose that the reference point
in the agreed payo¤ is the player’s worst Pareto-e¢cient Nash payo¤ which is the lower bound
for a long pre-play negotiation payo¤ derived in Rabin (1994).
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non-negative: This rules out revengeful feelings or spite, on the one hand and
positive emotions related to respecting agreements, on the other hand. This is
somewhat restrictive, but here we want to focus on guilt.
The parameters µ = (µ1; µ2) capture players’proneness to guilt. For a given
deviation, a player with a higher proneness to guilt su¤ers more. We only allow
for non-negative proneness to guilt, µi 2 [0;1). If it is common knowledge that
the proneness to guilt of both players equals zero, the model coupled with a
communication protocol is one of cheap talk13.
Notice …rst, that the guilt cost depends on the agreement and on the devia-
tion only indirectly through the agreed payo¤ and the harm. Second, choosing
the agreed action mi minimizes the guilt cost at the second stage. Furthermore,
(BD) implies that if disagreement is reached, then there is no guilt cost. We
assume that each player can unilaterally enforce disagreement; d. Also, there
are no bad feelings about own cheating if the opponent cheats too. Thus (BD)
introduces properties {B} and {D} into the guilt cost.
Moreover, we assume, that the guilt cost g(vi; hj) is weakly increasing in the
agreed payo¤ and in the harm: This introduces properties {A} and {C} into the
guilt cost.
g(vi; hj) is weakly increasing in vi and in hj (AC)
Obviously, if the guilt function is di¤erentiable then these monotonicity prop-




Also, we assume that if the player causes no harm to the opponent14 or if the
agreed payo¤ equals the worst Nash payo¤, then there is no guilt cost. Yet, we
assume that if strictly positive harm is caused and the agreed payo¤ is strictly
positive, then the guilt cost is strictly positive:
g(vi; hj) > 0 if hj > 0, vi > 0
g(vi; hj) = 0 if hj = 0 or vi = 0
(EF)
Notice that these assumptions allow for a number of possible cost functions.
For instance, a …xed guilt cost
g(vi; hj) =
½
° if hj > 0, vi > 0
0 otherwise
; (1)
or a guilt cost that only depends on one of the arguments is allowed. Another
example of a guilt cost function with all the properties assumed in this section
13As in Farrell (1987) but with any …nite extensive form communication protocol ending up
in an agreement -an action pro…le of the game.
14Andreoni (2005) provides some indirect evidence for this. In his extension of the buyer-
seller trust game where sellers can make non-binding promises of refunds, the sellers who
promise a refund, increase the return rates (quality) above no-buy utility so that no harm is
caused, if a promised refund request is rejected. Thus, for any realised rejection of refund,
guilt is avoided, and the present theory (or its straightforward extension to sequential two-
stage games) predicts rejection conditional on refund request and return rate above one which
the data in Andreoni seems to con…rm.
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is 15
g(ui(m); hj(m;si)) = maxfvi(m); 0g° maxfhj(m;si); 0g' (2)
This function is zero if the harm is non-positive or if the agreed payo¤ is below
0: Otherwise, it is strictly positive. It is increasing in the harm and in the agreed
payo¤.
We suppose that the proneness to guilt types and the language are common
knowledge. Thus, players have correct point predictions about their opponent’s
proneness to guilt and beliefs of all degrees coincide. Also, players do not have
to worry that the opponent might interpret an agreement to ‘meet at noon’as
an agreement to ‘meet at quarter past noon.’ Both these considerations are
relevant but at this …rst step we abstract from this.16
Let us now introduce some further notation. Denote by BRi(sj) the under-
lying game best reply correspondence of player i. Denote by ¡(m; µ) a subgame
where m is agreed and players’proneness to guilt is given by µ: Denote by
s¤(m; µ) = (s¤i (m; µ); s
¤
j (m; µ)) the equilibrium correspondences in that sub-
game.
Let us write the payo¤s of player i and player j respectively when player
i deviates to si and player j respects the agreement, sj = mj as
Ui(mi; mj ; si;mj) = ui(m) + bi(m;si) ¡ µig(ui(m); hj(m;si)) (3)
and
Uj(mj; mi;mj; si) = uj(m) ¡ hj(m; si): (4)
where the …rst two entries of Ui(:; :; :; :) describe the agreed actions and the
last two entries describe the played actions of i and j respectively. These ex-
pressions give players’entire game payo¤s in terms of the agreed payo¤, the
bene…t from breaching, and the harm in‡icted on the other when i breaches
but not j. Player’s incentive to breach an agreement m is the di¤erence be-
tween the bene…t from breaching and the guilt cost, Bi(m;si; µi) ´ bi(m;si) ¡
µig(ui(m); hj(m;si)):
An agreement m is called incentive compatible if neither bene…ts from a
unilateral deviation from the agreement,
for all si 2 Si Bi(m;si; µi) · 0 (ICi)
When this incentive compatibility condition holds for both players, the agree-
ment m is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame where m is agreed upon, ¡(m; µ).
On the other hand, an agreement m is called individually rational if no player
prefers enforcing disagreement (pre-play negotiations) over playing m, i.e. if for
i = 1; 2
ui(m) ¸ u¤i : (IRi)
15The entire game preferences of this form with ° = ' = 1 belong to the class of Cox-
Friedman (2002) preferences with ® = 1 with the emotional state depending on the agreed
payo¤ vi(m).
16Notice also that since guilt depends on the ageement only indirectly, any permutation of
the meanings of the agreements leaves the guilt unaltered.
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Here, the threat for the player who enforces d is the lowest payo¤ Nash equilib-
rium, u¤i .
We now de…ne player i’s potential to agree as Ai(¡; µi) ´ fmj m satis…es
(ICi) and (IRi)g and the agreeable set is de…ned as the intersection of the two
potentials to agree, A(¡; µ) ´ \i=1;2Ai(¡; µi): We call an action pro…le in i0s
potential to agree agreeable for i and we call an action pro…le in the agreeable
set simply agreeable.
4 A public good game
The prisoner’s dilemma is a stylized version of a public good game where it is
strictly dominant not to contribute:
C N
C u1; u2 u1 ¡ h1; u2 + b2
N u1 + b1; u2 ¡ h2 0; 0
where hi > ui > 0 and bi > 0 for i = 1; 2. Supposing that the guilt cost takes
the simple form of the example given in (2), player i respects an agreement to




This is an incentive compatibility condition. Moreover, both contributing is in-
dividually rational by the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma. So, an agreement
on (C; C) should be particularly easy to reach if bi is small and hj is large -just
as Gneezy (2005) suggests. Also, a large ui facilitates cooperative agreements.
This gives us comparative statics results that are testable.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, individual rationality rules out patterns (C; N) and
(N; C): Both not contributing is incentive compatible and individually rational
for all types since it is the unique Nash equilibrium. Hence, (N;N) is always
agreeable and (C;C) is agreeable if (5) holds for both players.
Proneness to guilt may transform a prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination
game. This is a familiar property of fairness models. Yet here, …rst, the trans-
formation is explicit; and second, the ability to commit to contribute does not
depend on how much more or less the opponent gets when players cooperate;
ui ¡ uj. It depends on how much more the player gets when players contribute
than when they do not, ui ¡ 0. On the other hand, the payo¤ of the opponent
is internalized only to the extent of how much a player’s defection a¤ects the
opponent’s payo¤.
Guilt in‡icts a cost of defection. It is trivial that if this cost is su¢ciently
large to balance o¤ the bene…t from breaching, the player can credibly commit
not to defect. Yet, the prisoner’s dilemma is a rather degenerate game: there
is only one action pro…le that Pareto dominates the underlying game Nash
equilibrium. Thus, the set of agreements under negotiation is very limited.
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Our pre-play negotiations model may have bite in any game with an ine¢cient
equilibrium.
A game to which we can easily generalize the prisoner’s dilemma type of argu-
mentation is the following public good game. Each player has an endowment of
ten dollars. Each player decides how many dollars to contribute, si 2 f0; :::; 10g.




sk) + 10 ¡ si
where the production technology G(:) maps the sum of contributions into the
amount of public good produced. We suppose that for all (s1; s2), G0(
P
s) <
1 where G0 is the marginal per capita return (MPCR): Hence, it is a strictly
dominant strategy and thus a Nash equilibrium strategy to contribute nothing.
Whenever marginal group return equals 2G0 > 1, it is socially optimal to increase
one’s contribution.
Let us suppose for the time being that the guilt cost is given by (2) with
° = ' = 1 and let the production technology have constant or decreasing
returns to scale, G00 · 0. Players can agree to any agreement where both get
a positive payo¤ and the guilt is su¢cient to prevent breaching. The harm





which is decreasing in the sum of contributions and thus in e¢ciency when too
little is contributed. The marginal bene…t from a unit underprovision vis-à-
vis the agreement is 1 ¡ hj(m; mi ¡ 1) and thus it is increasing in the sum of
contributions.
Notice further, that due to the concavity of payo¤ in each action, it is su¢-
cient to check for one dollar underprovision only: the bene…t from breaching is
concave and the harm on the other is convex as a rescaled negative of opponent’s
payo¤. Let us call the di¤erence of the marginal bene…t from breaching and the










mi ¡ 1)]' maxfui(m); 0g° :
Supposing that an indi¤erent player respects the agreement, a player will breach
if and only if (6) is positive. This is the marginal incentive compatibility con-
dition. Since bene…t from breaching is increasing and the harm on others is
decreasing in the sum of contributions, there is a con‡ict between the e¢ciency
of the agreement and the incentives to respect.




mk) + 10 ¡ mi ¸ 0: (7)
Notice yet, that (7) is actually redundant: it is implied by the incentive com-
patibility condition. When the agreed payo¤ approaches zero, the second term
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of (6) approaches zero too and an agreement o¤ the underlying best reply corre-
spondence is not incentive compatible for any type. Thus the marginal incentive
compatibility conditions are necessary and su¢cient for agreeability (6).
Some of the properties explicit in (6) are worth emphasizing. To a lesser
extent, a player with a higher proneness to guilt can agree on a larger set of
agreements. Second, the relative contributions matter (but not the relative
payo¤s). More importantly, as identi…ed above, the trading o¤ of marginal
harm and marginal bene…t implies a con‡ict between e¢ciency and incentives
when G00 < 0. If we isolate the e¤ect of the own action, mi, on the incentive
to breach, the con‡ict is ampli…ed by its positive e¤ect on the agreed payo¤.
Yet, increasing mj has the opposite e¤ect on the agreed payo¤ and, since by
assumption e¢ciency is increased, the overall agreed payo¤ e¤ect on guilt is
positive. This tends to decrease incentives to breach.
Thus, whether or not there is a con‡ict overall depends on G00 on the one
hand and on G0 and @gui on the other. If G
00 is close to zero the trading o¤ of
bene…t and harm is una¤ected but the agreed payo¤ e¤ect decreases incentives
to breach. Yet if G00 is larger and the agreed payo¤ does not much a¤ect
guilt, the e¤ect of trading o¤ bene…t and harm increases incentives to breach.
Furthermore, if G00 is large the agreed payo¤ e¤ect tends to fade away with
e¢ciency. Eventually, if we have an interior group optimum, there will be
a con‡ict between e¢ciency and incentives as we are su¢ciently close to the
group optimum.
Yet, as a special case, if there are constant returns to scale, G0 = ®, the mar-
ginal payo¤s are constant and the changes in breaching incentives are driven only
by the agreed payo¤ e¤ects: incentives to breach decrease with e¢ciency. Fur-
ther, the marginal bene…t from breaching decreases in ® and the marginal harm
increases in ® and the agreed payo¤ of any agreeable action pro…le increases in
®: Thus, it is easier for the players to agree when the marginal per capita return
is higher.
Let us collect the …ndings of this section in a proposition.
Proposition 1 Let g satisfy (2) with ' ¸ 1. In the public good game,
² an agreement is agreeable i¤ the marginal incentive to breach is non-
positive for i = 1; 2.
² player i’s marginal incentive to breach is increasing in mi.
² if G0 = ®, player i’s marginal incentive to breach is decreasing in ® and
in mj and in
P
k=1;2 mk.
² if G00 < 0 and ° = 0, player i0s marginal incentive to breach is increasing
in mj and in
P
k=1;2 mk.
Proof. For the …rst claim, it is straightforward that
m satis…es ICi for i = 1; 2 , m is agreeable,
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since ICi implies IRi. It is easy to see that an upward deviation never pays
o¤. Thus, it su¢ces to show that a non-positive marginal incentive to breach is
equivalent to a non-positive incentive for deviating to any si 2 Si. We have for




mk) + G(mj + mi ¡ si) ¡ µig(vi(m); [G(
X
k=1;2
mk) ¡ G(mj + mi ¡ si)])
· [1 ¡ G(
X
k=1;2




mk) ¡ G(mj + mi ¡ 1i)](mi ¡ si)) (9)
· [1 ¡ G(
X
k=1;2




mk) ¡ G(mj + mi ¡ 1i)]) (11)
· 0 (12)
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that the opponent’s payo¤ is
increasing in si and that g is convex in hj ; and the second inequality follows
from the fact that [mi ¡ si] ¸ 1.
For the second claim, increasing mi will decrease ui(m) and thus vi(m),
increase bi(m; mi ¡ 1) = 1 ¡ G(
P
k=1;2 mk) + G(mj + mi ¡ 1) and decrease
hj(m; mi ¡ 1) = G(
P
k=1;2 mk) ¡ G(mj + mi ¡ 1).
For the third claim, increasing ® will increase ui(m) and thus vi(m), decrease
bi(m;mi ¡ 1) and increase hj(m;mi ¡ 1). Increasing mj or
P
k=1;2 mk will in-
crease ui(m) and thus vi(m) and leave bi(m; mi¡1) and hj(m; mi¡1) una¤ected.
For the fourth claim, increasing mj or
P
k=1;2 mk will increase ui(m) and
thus vi(m) but since ° = 0 this will not a¤ect g. Increasing mj or
P
k=1;2 mk will
increase bi(m;mi ¡ 1) and decrease hj(m;mi ¡ 1).
Proposition 1 establishes that instead of checking for all possible deviations
it is necessary and su¢cient simply to check for a local deviation. Thus, to
determine a player’s potential to agree, we can look for agreements where the
player is indi¤erent between respecting and deviating marginally. Any agree-
ment where a player’s action is smaller or an opponent’s action is larger than
at the boundary is agreeable for that player.
Figure 1 shows the agreeable set for G0 = ® = 34 ; µi = 4 and g(vi; hj) as in
(2).
The action pro…les that belong to player one’s potential to agree are marked
with plus signs and the action pro…les that belong to player two’s potential to
agree are marked with crosses. Thus the action pro…les marked with asterisks are
agreeable action pro…les, A(¡PG(34 ); (4; 4)): Notice, that the best reply curves
lie on the axes and that each player’s best reply curve is agreeable for each
player. Thus, the Nash equilibrium, (0; 0), is agreeable. Notice also that some
e¢cient action pro…les are agreeable: for instance the symmetric e¢cient action
pro…le where both give a full contribution, m = (10; 10).
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 X agreeable for player one                    +  agreeable for player  2x Agreeable for player 2 + Agreeable for player 1
Figure 1: Figure 1: The agreeable set
Figure 2 illustrates how easy it is to agree on the symmetric e¢cient action
pro…le. Speci…cally, it plots the critical µ that makes a player indi¤erent between
breaching and respecting as a function of ®. As stated above, increasing ® makes













Figure 2: Indi¤erent player at symmetric e¢cient pro…le given ®
Indeed, we have shown in this section that when communication is allowed in
public good games and players are prone to guilt, players may agree to contribute
positive amounts and guilt provides the necessary incentives to commit to the
agreement. Further in regards to the experiments by Isaac, Mccue and Plott
(1985) and Isaac and Walker (1988), we have suggested that a likely explanation
for the di¤erences in their results may not be that it is di¢cult for the players
to identify an interior group optimum. Rather that agreements su¢ciently close
to the group optimum su¤er from a con‡ict between e¢ciency of the agreement
and the incentives to respect it. This con‡ict is absent when it is optimal to
contribute everything to the public good as in Isaac and Walker (1988). Notice
that it is crucial here that guilt cost is convex in the harm on the other. For
instance constant guilt cost due to a deviation, (1), cannot account for the
di¤erence since with that speci…cation guilt is concave in the harm on other17.
Other social preference models can explain positive contributions to public
goods but none have explained why communication further increases contribu-
tions. In this section we have shown this for players who without communication
have a strictly dominant strategy to contribute nothing. This does not seem
to comply with the empirical …nding that even without communication positive
amounts are contributed. Yet, the next section develops the theory in the more
general case where the underlying game preferences may take an arbitrary form
(and may thus involve social preferences) and equilibria of the game are ine¢-
cient. The section shows in particular how the present theory can account for
17This will imply, the model of Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004) cannot account for the
di¤erences in e¢ciciency results of Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985) and Isaac and Walker
(1988).
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the fact that communication increases contributions from the levels that prevail
without communication.
Further, the next section generalizes the sharp contrast in feasibility of …rst–
best e¢ciency between constant returns to scale technology and decreasing re-
turns to scale technology in public good games: there is a con‡ict between incen-
tives and e¢ciency in symmetric submodular games where payo¤ is monotone
in opponent’s action. Such a con‡ict tends to be absent in symmetric super-
modular games with monotone payo¤ in opponent’s action.
5 Properties of the agreeable set
This section derives some simple properties that apply to any normal form
underlying game. First, any UG Nash equilibrium is agreeable. Thus, the
agreeable set is never smaller than the set of Nash equilibria of the UG. Second,
a Nash equilibrium remains a Nash equilibrium of most subgames that follow an
agreement. Yet, if an agreement is such that a player can unilaterally deviate
to an UG Nash equilibrium, then this UG Nash equilibrium may no longer
be a Nash equilibrium when the agreement is made. Third, if a player can
deviate from an agreement and thereby bene…t both players, the action pro…le
is not agreeable. Yet, any individually rational pro…le that does not satisfy
this property can be agreed upon if proneness to guilt is su¢ciently high. This
characterizes the largest possible agreeable set as opposed to the smallest such
set -the set of UG Nash equilibria.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, both (D; C) and (D;D) are agreeable for the row
player. Both pro…les are individually rational for the row player and the row
player’s agreed action is an UG best reply to the agreed action of the column
player. Underlying game preferences drive the player to choose the best reply. If
a player’s agreed action is a best reply to the agreed action of the other player,
the guilt cost of deviating would only add to the forgone UG payo¤ . The …rst
part of the following lemma establishes this general …nding.
On the other hand, if a player’s agreed action is not a best reply to the
opponent’s agreed action, then the agreement belongs to the player’s potential
to agree if and only if it is incentive compatible. The UG bene…t from breaching
is positive at least for the deviation to the best reply; if individual rationality is
violated, the guilt cost is zero and the agreement is not incentive compatible.
Lemma 2 Let mi 2 BRi(mj). Then m 2 Ai(¡; µi) i¤ (IRi) holds.
Let mi =2 BRi(mj). Then m 2 Ai(¡; µi) i¤ (ICi) holds.
Proof. See appendix.
This lemma is useful for characterizing each player’s potential to agree: on
the best reply curve, all individually rational agreements are agreeable. O¤ the
best reply curve, all incentive compatible agreements are agreeable and no other
agreement is. Thus, for non-equilbirium conventions only incentive compatibil-
ity matters. On the other hand, lemma 2 enables us to generalize the …nding
that, in the prisoner’s dilemma, the defection equilibrium is agreeable for any
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proneness to guilt types. By de…nition, any Nash equilibrium payo¤ is individ-
ually rational. Thus by the …rst part of lemma 2, any Nash equilibrium belongs
to each player’s potential to agree. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is agreeable.
Proposition 3 If m 2 NE(¡), then m 2 A(¡; µ):
Proof. See appendix.
First, for zero proneness to guilt types, Nash equilibria are the only agreeable
action pro…les.18 Second, guilt never reduces the menu of agreements available
to the players. To the contrary, the public good example shows that positive
proneness to guilt can dramatically increase the set of pro…les that are agreeable.
Recall that we ruled out mixed strategies and thus an agreeable pro…le may
not exist. Notice, that allowing for mixed strategies would ensure that an agree-
able pro…le always exists (whichever way we think about guilt): an underlying
game Nash equilibrium is always agreeable and with mixed strategies a Nash
equilibrium always exists in …nite games.
Yet, pre-play negotiations may create an equilibrium selection problem when
there is an agreement in place and players are prone to guilt. For instance,
when players agree on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, defection remains
an equilibrium of the transformed game. If both players defect, neither feels
guilt and payo¤s involve only underlying game payo¤s. This insight is easily
generalized: it is straightforward that an underlying game equilibrium where
neither respects the agreement, m, is an equilibrium of the subgame ¡(m; µ).
This shows that even if m is a Nash equilibrium of ¡(m; µ), there may be other
equilibria as well.
Lemma 4 If for i = 1; 2; mi 6 =s¤i and s¤ 2 NE(¡) then s¤ 2 NE(¡(m; µ))
Proof. See appendix.
The equilibrium selection problem apparent in lemma (4) is avoided however
if we suppose that players will conform to the agreement, if there is no incentive
not to do so, as assumed in Farrell (1987).19 Lemma (4) shows that an UG
Nash equilibrium may be a Nash equilibrium of a subgame where players do
not agree on that Nash equilibrium. Notice yet, that this is not true for any
agreement. Nash equilibria may be removed from the game.
Consider the following game of chicken:
L R
T 0; 0 3; 1
B 1; 3 2; 2
(13)
18Aumann (1990) argues that cheap talk is credible only for a subset of Nash equilibria.
19Applying Farrell (1987), we may re…ne the Nash equilibrium concept in the subgame
¡(m; µ) by assuming that if m is a Nash equilibrium of ¡(m; µ), then m will be played,
s¤(m; µ) = m.
Farrell and Rabin (1996) discuss messages that are self-enforcing. There are three reasons
to be suspicious about a message (or an agreement). First, players may have di¤erent under-
standing what the message means. Second, even if messages are understood correctly, players
may have incentives to mislead their opponents. Self-signalling messages are sent, if and only
if they are true. Self-commiting messages are such that if believed, the sender will have an
incentive to do accordingly.
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The Nash equilibria of this game are (B;L) and (T; R). Let us suppose that
player one’s proneness to guilt is two, µ1 = 2 and the guilt cost function is as in
(1) with ° = 1. Let us suppose that players agree on playing (B;R) which gives
an agreed payo¤ of 2 for player one. Now, if player one breaches the agreement
and chooses T instead, she gets 3 ¡ 2 = 1 which is smaller than 2 and, thus,
(T; R) is not an equilibrium when players have agreed on (B;R) even if it is a
Nash equilibrium of the underlying game.
Next, we show that an agreement where one of the players can make both
players better o¤ by deviating unilaterally from the agreement (even if the
opponent respects the agreement) does not belong to the agreeable set.
Lemma 5 For any m; if there is a player i such that there exists si such that
ui(si; mj) > ui(m) and uj(si; mj) ¸ uj(m) then m =2 A(¡; µ) for any µ.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 5 follows immediately from the monotonicity (AC) and the strict cost
(EF) conditions: when the harm in‡icted on the other is non-positive, there is
no guilt cost. Since a player can make herself better o¤, she will do so and the
agreement is not incentive compatible.
Thus, for instance pattern (B;L) is never agreeable in the following game:
L R
T 2; 2 0; 100
B 1; 1 1; 1
(14)
since if player one breaches and chooses T , both players are better o¤. One
could argue that player one does not breach (B;L) because she understands
that then player two has an incentive to choose R which would make her worse
o¤ than in (B; L). But of course, player one would then be inclined to choose
B: Agreeing on (B;L) would thus leave a lot of room for rationalizing various
kinds of play and truth is no more focal in the sense of Farrell (1987). Indeed,
this type of plurality may question whether (B; L) is agreeable in the …rst place.
But for our analysis, it is su¢cient to notice that since player 1 can make both
better o¤, the agreement is not incentive compatible.
In (14), players cannot agree on (T;R) either, since player 1 gets a smaller
payo¤ than in the underlying game equilibrium, (B;R). On the other hand, if
player 2’s proneness to guilt is small, players cannot agree on (T;L) either due
to player two’s high gain from choosing R instead. But if we let player two’s
proneness to guilt become su¢ciently high, (T; L) becomes agreeable. As the
proneness to guilt becomes in…nite, the guilt cost becomes in…nite for deviations
that cause a positive harm. Hence, whenever deviation causes harm, it will not
be made. In general, if UG payo¤s are …nite, with su¢ciently high proneness to
guilt all individually rational pro…les are agreeable for which a Pareto-improving
deviation does not exist (the deviator must strictly bene…t), and no other pro…le
is.
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Proposition 6 Let the underlying game payo¤s be …nite. Let vi(m) > 0 for
i = 1; 2. Then m 2 limµ1!1;µ2!1A(¡; µ) i¤ for i = 1; 2 and for all si, ui(m) ¸
ui(si; mj) or uj(mj; si) < ui(m)
Proof. See appendix.
If the set of Nash equilibria is the smallest set that is agreeable (cheap-talk),
proposition 6 describes the largest possible agreeable set, the agreeable set for
types that are in…nitely prone to guilt.
Lemma 5 has another implication, which is mentioned here without a proof.
Namely, within the agreeable set, the interests of the players are opposed for
any change in one of the agreed actions.
Corollary 7 Let (mi; mj); (m0i;mj) 2 A(¡; µ) then
ui(mi; mj) > ui(m0i;mj) ) uj(m0i;mj) > uj(mi; mj)
uj(m0i;mj) > uj(mi; mj) ) ui(mi; mj) ¸ ui(m0i; mj) (15)
6 Finite games with ordered strategy spaces
Let us now focus on …nite games with ordered strategy spaces, Si = fs1i ; :::; sni g.
Inspired by the results in the public good game where actions are ordered in
terms of contributed amounts, we seek to generalize two results gained there:
First, that the non-positive marginal incentives to breach are necessary and
su¢cient for a strategy pro…le to be agreeable. Second, trading o¤ the marginal
harm of a deviation with its marginal bene…t implies a con‡ict between e¢ciency
and incentives to respect when there are decreasing returns to scale in the public
good production whereas such a con‡ict is absent with constant returns to
scale. We show that, when the guilt cost is convex in the harm, the …rst result
generalizes to underlying games with concave payo¤ functions in each action.
For the second result, there is a con‡ict between incentives and e¢ciency in
symmetric submodular games where payo¤s are monotone. Such a con‡ict
tends to be absent in symmetric supermodular games with monotone payo¤s in
opponent’s action.
Symmetric games with strategic complements avoid the con‡ict only if cer-
tain convexity properties are present: a symmetric e¢cient agreement can be
made if the players can agree on any symmetric pro…le that is not an underlying
game equilibrium.
We now adopt some new concepts and notational simpli…cations. We denote
the action sni by its order label n so that for k 2 Z, sni + k := sn+ki . Also
for s 2 S we let s + k := (si + k; sj + k). We let the marginal bene…t from
breaching be de…ned as ¯i(mi; mj)
:
= bi(mi; mj ;mi ¡1); and the marginal harm
as ´(mi; mj)
:
= hi(mi; mj ;mi ¡1). Thus ¯i(m+k) = ¯i(mi +k; mj +k); ´i(m+
k) = ´i(mi + k;mj + k), and ui(m + k) = ui(mi + k;mj + k) for k 2 Z.
We …rst set the scene by making further assumptions on the underlying game.
In addition to supposing that the game is …nite, we suppose that
{1} The payo¤ of player i is increasing in the action of player j
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{2} The player’s payo¤ is concave in her own action and in that of the opponent.
That is, for all s
±i(s)
:
= ui(si + 1; sj) ¡ ui(si; sj) ¡ [ui(si; sj) ¡ ui(si ¡ 1; sj)] · 0
and for all s
¾i(s)
:
= uj(sj + 1; si) ¡ uj(sj ; si) ¡ [uj(sj; si) ¡ uj(sj ¡ 1; si)] · 0
{3} The payo¤ functions are supermodular (so that actions are strategic com-
plements). That is for all s
Ái(s)
:
= uj(sj; si) ¡ uj(sj ¡ 1; si) ¡ [uj(sj ; si ¡ 1) ¡ uj(sj ¡ 1; si ¡ 1)] ¸ 0:
These properties are satis…ed in the public good game, but in a degenerate
manner: for all s; ±i(s) = ¾i(s) = Ái(s) = 0. The …rst assumption is not crucial.
Indeed, if we reverse the ordering of strategies of both players, the payo¤ will
be decreasing in opponent’s action and, yet, concavity and supermodularity of
the payo¤s are unaltered. Thus, symmetric games with decreasing payo¤s in
opponent’s action can be analyzed using the same artillery.
Also, we make further assumptions on the guilt cost. We assume that if it is
convex in the harm, hj ; and in the agreed payo¤, vi, and that it is supermodular
in its two arguments
{4} g is convex in hj
{5} g is convex in vi and supermodular in its arguments.
Notice that the fact that the payo¤ is concave in the opponent’s action im-
plies that the harm hj is a convex function of si, since the harm is just a rescaled
negative of the underlying game payo¤. Thus, by assumption {4}; the guilt cost
is convex in si as a composite of two convex functions. Notice that assumption
{4} rules out constant guilt cost, (1), for instance, since with that speci…cation
guilt is concave in harm20 . On the other hand, the underlying game payo¤
ui is concave in si. Consequently, the problem of choosing the optimal devia-
tion given that the opponent respects is a simple convex optimization problem.
Hence, checking that neither prefers to breach the agreement marginally is nec-
essary and su¢cient for an agreement to be incentive compatible.
To simply formulate such a condition, we extend the concept of the marginal
incentive to breach from the public good game example.
De…nition 8 (Marginal incentive to breach)
If ui(mi ¡ 1;mj) ¡ ui(m) ¸ 0
Bi(m; µi)
:
= ¯i(m) ¡ µig(vi(m); ´j(m))
20This will imply, the model of Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004) cannot account for the
di¤erences in e¢ciciency results of Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985) and Isaac and Walker
(1988).
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When ui(mi ¡ 1; mj) ¡ ui(m) < 0, there is certainly no incentive to deviate
downwards but there may be an incentive to deviate upwards. The fact that
Bi(m; µi) does not involve any guilt cost when ui(mi ¡ 1;mj) ¡ ui(m) < 0 is
due to the fact that, by assumption {1}, an upward deviation does not make
the opponent worse o¤ and thus the player does not su¤er from guilt.
Consequently, assumption {1} on the underlying game payo¤s together with
lemma 5 gives us a necessary condition for an action pro…le to be agreeable.
The play must belong to the following set21
MF = fmjui(mi;mj) is non-increasing in mi for i = 1; 2g (16)
Next, we establish the necessary and a su¢cient condition for agreeability
that generalizes our …nding in the public good game. We established above that,
due to the convexity of the problem, there is no incentive to breach the agree-
ment at the margin i¤ and only if there is no incentive to breach at all. Second,
incentive compatibility implies individual rationality when o¤ the underlying
game best reply curves by lemma 2. Thus, we have the following.
Proposition 9 Let ¡ be …nite. Let mi 6= BRi(mj) and mi =2 fs1i ; sni g. Let {1},
{2} and {4} hold. Then an action pro…le is agreeable for i if and only if the
marginal incentive to breach is non-positive.
Proof. See appendix.
As the terms of the agreement are altered, the marginal incentive to breach
is a¤ected through three channels: i) the direct e¤ect through the marginal
bene…t from breaching; ii) an indirect e¤ect through the marginal harm on
the opponent; iii) an indirect e¤ect through the agreed payo¤. The latter two
are indirect in that they a¤ect the marginal incentive to breach through the
marginal guilt cost.
In the public good game, we found that the marginal incentive to breach is
monotone in each agreed action. We can generalize this property. Let us …rst
consider how a change in one agreed action a¤ects the trading o¤ of bene…t and
harm from breaching.
Let us start with the e¤ect of the agreed action of player i, mi. It is neces-
sary that an agreeable action pro…le lies in MF . But within MF , the player’s
payo¤ must be decreasing in her action. Thus, the e¤ect of a player’s agreed
action on her marginal bene…t from breaching is nothing but the negative of
the second derivative, ¡±. Thereby, increasing a player’s agreed action increases
her marginal bene…t from breaching. Similarly, the e¤ect of mi on ´j is simply
the second derivative, ¾, since the harm is itself a rescaled negative of uj and
breaching takes place downwards. Thus increasing mi increases ¯i and decreases
21Except for mi = sni of course.
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´j and both these e¤ects have a positive impact on the marginal incentive to
breach.
The e¤ect of mj on ¯i and ´j rests on the strategic complementarity
22 of
actions. Due to strategic complementarity, if the opponent increases her ac-
tion, then the player has a stronger incentive to increase her own action. Since
breaching takes place downwards, increasing the opponent’s agreed action damp-
ens the underlying game bene…t from breaching. On the other hand, the higher
the opponent’s action, the more harm is in‡icted on her by marginally decreas-
ing the own action. Strictly supermodular games, where Á > 0, constitute a
set of games where such complementarities are present. The following lemma
summarizes the e¤ects of changing the terms of the agreement on the trade-o¤
between the bene…t and the harm of breaching.
Lemma 10 ¯i(mi + 1; mj) ¡ ¯i(mi;mj) = ¡±i(s)
´j(mi + 1; mj) ¡ ´j(mi; mj) = ¾j(s)
¯i(mi;mj + 1) ¡ ¯i(mi; mj) = ¡Ái(si; sj + 1)
´j(mi;mj + 1) ¡ ´j(mi; mj) = Áj(sj + 1; si)
Proof. See appendix.
Now consider the third e¤ect -the agreed payo¤ e¤ect -of mi and mj on
the marginal incentive to breach. This e¤ect goes through the agreed payo¤.
Corollary 7 together with {1} imply that the agreed payo¤s change monoton-
ically in the agreeable set: increasing own agreed action decreases the agreed
payo¤ and increasing the opponent’s action increases payo¤. Thus, when mi is
increased; also the agreed payo¤ e¤ect has a positive impact on the marginal
incentive to breach. On the other hand, there is a negative impact when mj is
increased. Thus the agreed payo¤ e¤ects are aligned with the marginal harm
and bene…t e¤ects. Thus, in supermodular games, increasing an opponent’s
action decreases the marginal incentive to breach 23 . Similarly, increasing the
own agreed action increases the marginal incentive to breach.
Proposition 11 Let the actions be ordered. Let {1}, {2}, {3} ,{4} and {5}
hold. Then i0s marginal incentive to breach is increasing in mi and decreasing
in mj in the agreeable set.
Proof. See appendix
Notice that the agreed payo¤ re‡ects a player’s preference ordering of agree-
ments conditional on both respecting. Thus, keeping one of the actions …xed and
changing the other, the preference over agreements and the incentive to respect
them are aligned. Yet, in symmetric submodular games where Á < 0; there
is some con‡ict in the preference over agreements and the incentive to respect
them.
22See Bulow et al. (1985).
23Also, supermodularity of g is needed so that the interplay between the agreed payo¤ and
the harm e¤ect in the guilt cost does not contradict other e¤ects.
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Furthermore, this implies that, apart from the agreed payo¤ e¤ect, in sym-
metric submodular games where {2} holds, e¢ciency and incentives to respect
are in con‡ict. To see this, notice that no agreement where a player is required
to choose an action smaller than her underlying game best reply is e¢cient.
Symmetric pro…les that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium are such that both
agreed actions are higher than in equilibrium. But, increasing both actions by
one step, increases the marginal bene…t from breaching and decreases the mar-
ginal harm on the opponent. Thus, abstracting from the agreed payo¤ e¤ect
and only focusing on the trading-o¤ of harm and bene…t, the incentive to breach
is increased.





j ) = 0. If ui(s
¤ + k)¡ u(s¤) > 0 for k 2 Z then ¯i(s¤ +
k) > 0 and ´i(s
¤ + k) < ´i(s¤).
Proof. See appendix.
While theorem 12 establishes a con‡ict between e¢ciency and agreeability,
we know on the other hand that in the public good game e¢ciency and the
incentives to breach may well be aligned: an e¢cient action pro…le can be
agreed upon if and only if an interior non-equilibrium action pro…le can be
agreed upon. In theorem 13, we establish that this holds more generally in
symmetric supermodular games. The result is not as robust as the con‡ict
result, however. We need some further, not very restrictive assumptions which
are satis…ed in many examples.
Either we need to suppose that guilt is una¤ected by the agreed payo¤
(° = 0 in the public good example above) or we suppose that the UG payo¤ is
convex in identical changes of both actions. For the latter case, when the UG
payo¤ is convex in this way and the payo¤ is increasing in such changes, it is
increasing in symmetric changes from the symmetric interior equilibrium up to
the symmetric e¢cient pro…le where actions cannot be increased any further.
Thus, a symmetric non-equilibrium action pro…le is agreeable if and only if an
e¢cient action pro…le is.
This argument su¢ces for the case that best reply curves are not particularly
steep. When they are steep, there may be multiple equilbria and we can use
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) result that in supermodular games when payo¤s are
increasing in opponent’s action, the equilibria are ordered in terms of e¢ciency.
Thus, the pro…le of maximal contributions is e¢cient and also agreeable as an
underlying game equilibrium.
Theorem 13 Let {1},{2} and {3} hold. Let ±i(s); ¾i(s) and Ái(s) be constant
for i = 1; 2. Let ¡ be symmetric and let s¤ be its ine¢cient Nash equilibrium such
that ¯i(s
¤) = 0 for i = 1; 2. Let g satisfy {4}. Suppose either (a) that Á+¾ ¸ 0
and g(v0; ´) = g(v; ´) for all ´ and v0; v > 0 or (b) that 2Á + ± + ¾ ¸ 0 and
g satis…es {5}:
Then, a symmetric e¢cient s is agreeable i¤ a symmetric s 6= s¤ is agreeable
Proof. See appendix.
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Proposition 11 shows that in games with strategic complements the marginal
incentive to breach has intuitive monotonicity properties: as the action of the
opponent is increased, a player’s incentive to breach decreases whereas the op-
posite is true when the player’s own action is increased. On the other hand, in
supermodular games, players are able to reach symmetric e¢cient agreements
if anything else that is symmetric and tha is not an interior UG equilibrium can
be agreed upon.
Notice again, that assumption {1} was made without loss of generality. All
we need is symmetry. If the payo¤ is decreasing in the opponent’s action, we
can restore assumption {1} by reversing the ordering of each strategy set. This
will a¤ect neither the concavity of the UG payo¤ in each action nor the super-
or submodularity of the underlying game payo¤.
In addition to the linear public good game studied above, examples of sym-
metric supermodular games include, for instance, team work designs and part-
nerships, or the Bertrand duopoly with imperfect substitutes. Yet, as we have
seen the monotonicity properties and e¢ciency results do not generally hold
in symmetric submodular games where the payo¤ is increasing in opponent’s
action.
Examples of symmetric games with strategic substitutes are the game of
chicken (see section 5) and public good provision with a concave production
technology. The chicken is a stylized version of a public good game with a
provision threshold. Experimental evidence on the e¤ect of communication in
the public good games with a threshold is mixed. On the other hand, Isaac,
McCue and Plott (1985) …nd rather weak e¤ects of communication on e¢ciency
in a public good game with decreasing returns technology whereas Isaac and
Walker (1988) …nd a very strong positive e¤ect of communication on e¢ciency
with a constant returns to scale technology. Thus, our theory organizes rather
well the di¤erences in the e¤ects of communication in public good games.
The next section studies a Cournot duopoly as an example of a symmetric
game with strategic substitutes. Thus, the incentives to respect more collusive
agreements tend to be weaker.
7 Cournot duopoly
Let us now study an example to see what happens when supermodularity of
the underlying game is violated. We transform a linear Cournot duopoly with
imperfect substitutes where pro…ts read as ¼i(q) = ( 192 ¡ 12qi ¡ qj)qi and the
strategy set is qi 2 f0; :::; 10g into an equivalent game24 where the strategy sets
24Notice that despite the negative strategies, this is indeed a game equivalent to a Cournot





esi ¡ esj)esi; 0g where esi = ¡si. The transformation is done in order to satisfy
assumption {1}. Both the transformation and the orginal game are submodular. The pay-
o¤s are chosen to make the best reply mapping simple. Vives (1989) shows that it can be
transformed into an equivalent game which is supermodular by setting es2 = ¡s2. Such a
transformation would yield Á = 1 > 0 and ±+ 2Á+ ¾ = 1. However, then both payo¤s are not
increasing in the action of the opponent and we would lose the symmetry of the game.
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are si 2 f¡10; :::; 0g and the underlying game payo¤ of player i reads





si + sj)si; 0g (17)
This transformation makes i’s payo¤ increasing in opponent’s action but pre-
serves symmetry, concavity of payo¤s {2}, and submodularity {3}. First, in-
creasing player i0s action by one unit from si increases the payo¤ of the oppo-
nent:
ui(si; sj + 1) ¡ ui(si; sj) = ¡si > 0 (18)
Second, ± = ¡1, ¾ = 0. And third, Á = ¡1. Thus, all other assumptions hold
but is {3} violated.
Condition (16) requires that i0s marginal payo¤, ¡10¡sj ¡si, is non-positive
if s is agreeable for i. Thus, an agreeable action pro…le satis…es m 2 fsj10 +
sj + si ¸ 0; i = 1; 2g: Notice, that player i’s underlying game best reply to sj is
BRi(sj) = ¡10 ¡ sj (19)
Thus the unique underlying game equilibrium is s1 = ¡5 = s2 which gives
payo¤ u¤i = ui(5; 5) = 10 to both players. At this equilibrium, the bene…t from
breaching is exactly zero, ¯(5; 5) = 0 as required in theorem 13.
Let’s suppose that the guilt cost is as in (2). This guilt cost is supermodu-
lar in its arguments and convex in ui as required in proposition 11. The proof
of proposition 9 states that, o¤ the best reply correspondences, a non-positive
marginal incentive to breach is necessary and su¢cient for incentive compatibil-
ity. Each player wants to deviate downwards. The marginal incentive to breach
writes
10 + sj + si + µi[ui(s) ¡ 10]sj (20)
This is increasing in a player’s own action but the e¤ect of the opponent’s
action is ambiguous (as opposed to proposition 11 which assumes that the game
is supermodular).
So as to the e¤ect of the own action, since ± = ¡1, ¾ = 0 increasing a
player’s agreed action increases the player’s marginal bene…t from breaching
and leaves the marginal harm una¤ected. Within the agreeable set, the agreed
payo¤ e¤ects are as before: thus, the agreed payo¤ decreases in the player’s own
action. To sumarize, the marginal incentive to breach is indeed increasing in a
player’s own action.
Yet, if we consider the e¤ect of the opponent’s action, now since the game
is submodular; Á = ¡1, rather than supermodular, increasing the opponent’s
action decreases the marginal harm on the opponent and decreases a player’s
marginal bene…t from breaching. Agreed payo¤ increases in a player’s own
action, as before. The agreed payo¤ e¤ect and the other two e¤ects now run
counter to each other. Thus, the e¤ect on the opponent’s incentive to breach
is ambiguous: the monotonicity of the marginal incentive to breach in agreed
actions (proposition 11) is lost.
Now, let us move on and consider theorem 13 which studies whether e¢cient
agreements can be made, if any. Figure 3 studies the positive quantity equivalent
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of the game.25 There, we suppose that the proneness to guilt is µi = 17 for both
players. The action pro…les marked with a plus sign are agreeable for player 1
and the action pro…les marked with a cross are agreeable for player 2. Thus,
the action pro…les marked with an asterisk belong to the agreeable set. There
are two symmetric action pro…les in this set: the equilibrium (5; 5) and (4; 4).
Yet, the e¢cient symmetric action pro…le (3; 3) (marked with a circle) does not
belong to the agreeable set.26
Figure 3: The agreeable set in the Cournot duopoly.
The underlying game equilibrium (¡5; ¡5) is agreeable by proposition 3. To
see that (¡4;¡4) is agreeable, we check that the marginal incentive to breach is
negative; 10 ¡ 4 ¡ 4 ¡ 47 [14 ¡ 10] < 0: For s = (¡3 ¡ 3), the marginal incentive
to breach reads 10 ¡ 3 ¡ 3 ¡ 37 [15 ¡ 10] = 137 > 0 and thus, for µi = 17 i = 1; 2,
players can agree on s = (¡4; ¡4) but not on s = (¡3; ¡3):
This is because marginal symmetric changes of both actions (i) increase the
marginal bene…t by ¡± ¡ Á = 2 where both terms are strictly positive, (iib)
25The relevant …gure for the negative quantity game studied analytically is the projection
of …gure 3 through the orgin to the negative quadrant.









This is indeed concave in ¾. Looking at …rst order e¤ects, a unit increase in both actions
increases the expression in the brackets if and only if ¾ · ¡ 11
3
: The agreed payo¤s for the
symmetric action pro…les corresponding to the nearest two integers of ¾ = ¡ 11
3
are u(¡3;¡3) =
15 and u(¡4;¡4) = 14. Thus s = (¡3;¡3) is e¢cient.
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decrease the marginal harm by ¾ +Á = ¡1, and (iia) change the marginal e¤ect
of an increasing agreed payo¤ by ± + 2Á + ± = ¡4 < 0: The negative marginal
e¤ect on the marginal incentive to breach (iia) is vanishing but the positive
marginal e¤ects are constant and thus getting relatively stronger as the agreed
payo¤ is increased by symmetric changes of both actions. Thus, even if there
is a non-equilibrium action where guilt o¤sets the underlying game incentive
to breach, the incentives to respect a more e¢cient action pro…le are smaller.
Consequently, we also lose any e¢ciency property akin to that in theorem 13.
8 Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a game theoretic approach
to pre-play negotiations and conventions or social norms when people may feel
guilty about breaching an agreement. The model incorporates the most im-
portant stylized facts that research in social psychology and experimental eco-
nomics has established about guilt: on the one hand, experiments conducted by
Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004), Gneezy (2005) and Charness and Dufwenberg
(2003) suggest that people dislike lying and that the more harm they in‡ict on
others by doing so, the more they dislike it. In pre-play negotiations, agreeing
to choose an action that one intends not to choose amounts to lying. On the
other hand, research in social psychology reveals important stylized facts about
guilt that is felt about transgressing social norms in general, not about lying or
breaching agreements in particular.
We show that guilt, conventions and pre-play negotiation may have dramatic
e¤ects on strategic interaction. Trivially, the set of agreeable outcomes may be
larger than the set of underlying game Nash equilibria, since the guilt cost
provides an extra incentive to comply to an agreed action pro…le. Conventions
that are not equilibria in the underlying game are possible.
Moreover, the dramatic e¤ects may prevail even if monetary stakes are high:
in the prisoner’s dilemma, increasing the bene…t of defection su¢ciently while
keeping the harm on the opponent constant will restore the cheap talk prediction
that an agreement on cooperation will be breached; yet, no matter how large
the bene…t of lying, an agreement on cooperation will be credible when the
harm that the defection in‡icts on the opponent is su¢ciently high. Notice also
that a player does not become more reluctant to agree on cooperation when
she su¤ers more from defection. Quite the opposite: greater potential harm
on herself increases the opponent’s relative preference for cooperation since the
opponent’s promise to cooperate may become credible.
The theory presented is in line with results from public good experiments
without contribution thresholds where communication signi…cantly increases
contribution levels (Ledyard, 1995). Our theory tells us that for su¢ciently
high marginal per capita return, the bene…t of breaching a cooperative agree-
ment is o¤set by the harm on opponents. Thus, cooperative agreements become
credible27.
27Game theory generally abstracts from where utilities come from. That all agents con-
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This result extends to a large class of games with a public good structure:
moral hazard in teams, collusion in Bertrand and Cournot duopolies etc. Yet,
there is an important distinction as to whether the theory predicts an e¢cient
or an ine¢cient agreement: in symmetric games with strategic complements, a
symmetric non-underlying game equilibrium is agreeable if and only if a sym-
metric e¢cient action pro…le is agreeable. On the other hand, in symmetric
games with strategic substitutes, there tends to be a con‡ict between the in-
centives to respect an agreement and the e¢ciency of the agreement: trading
o¤ private bene…ts and the harm on others makes it harder to agree on more
e¢cient actions.
Experiments provide a strong support for our theory. Isaac, McCue and
Plott (1985) adopt a decreasing returns to scale production technology for the
public good. This implies that actions are strategic substitutes. Despite the
positive e¤ect of communication on e¢ciency, they …nd that the average con-
tribution levels fall far below the …rst-best (15% e¢cient). Isaac and Walker
(1988) adopt a constant returns to scale technology implying that actions are
weak strategic substitutes. They …nd a strong positive e¤ect of communication
on e¢ciency. Average contribution levels are up to 99% e¢cient.
Furthermore, notice that some public good games with a contribution thresh-
old have subsets of the strategy space where actions are strategic substitutes
rather than strategic complements. For instance, the stylized version of a public
good game with a threshold, the chicken game, has strategic substitutes. In the
threshold public good experiments, the e¤ect of communication on contribu-
tions has not always turned out to be signi…cant. Thus, even experiments in
threshold environments seem to lend support for our theory.
Second, as indicated, our results can be extended to analyze the enforcement
power of commonly known conventions and social norms 28. This is because we
abstract from the negotiation protocol and only analyze the interaction when
an agreement is in place. Norms here require choosing a particular action in a
given situation29. In this case, of course, no lies are told per se. Yet, research in
social psychology suggests that guilt about transgressing such exogenous norms
is stronger the more harm is in‡icted on others30 and, thus, property {A} among
tribute nothing to the public good implicitly assumes that players are money maximizers.
Empirical evidence shows that people contribute positive amounts even when the game is
played without communication. Distributional preference models map monetary payo¤ pro-
…les to individual utilities. Thus, the underlying game (in utils payo¤s) may di¤er from a
public good game and it may have equilibria where positive amounts are contributed. Even if
distributional preferences may be present in the game that is played without communication,
guilt combined with pre-play negotiation complements distributional preference motivations
in providing the extra incentive to contribute that is in line with what public good experiments
have found.
28 I thank Joel Sobel for poiting this out.
29Social norms can be considered to be established by a community’s moral discourse -
-grand scale pre-play negotiations: When John Doe violates a social norm, the violation
launches a vivid discourse by others in the community. This discussion may involve arguments
for and against John Doe’s action. If the social norm is well established arguments are mostly
against and parties quickly converge into an agreement on how John should have behaved.
30For evidence, see related literature in psychology in section 2.
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others remains valid. Thus, the theory can be interpreted as a tractable model of
let-down aversion where pre-play negotiation or convetions establish commonly
known, coinciding and justi…ed mutual expectations about behavior.
The theory presented in this paper has a further interpretations in addition
to face-to-face communication and convetions in one-shot games. Analogous
results to those presented in this paper would be obtained if we suppose that
players have zero proneness to guilt and they informally agree on a stationary
outcome in an in…nitely (and in…nitely often) repeated analog of the underly-
ing game. The punishment paths are not negotiated, however, but they are
exogenously determined (in a commonly known social contract, for instance).
If the agreement is breached, it takes some time to detect breaching, and, when
detected, players revert to mutual minmax strategies for a length of time that
depends on the deviator’s agreed payo¤ and the harm she in‡icts on the other.
As stated in the introduction, the origin of guilt, according to psychologists, re-
sides in such close communal relationships where the prevailing social contract
gets internalized.31
Pre-play communication may have other functions than implementing shared
standards of behavior. Pre-play communication could improve upon players’
knowledge and degree of knowledge about the relevant game and thus indirectly
promote certain actions as ideals of behavior. Our model abstracts from these
functions. Also, these functions may be relevant if we try to model how a
community communicates to reach a common understanding of its environment.
This paper has not analyzed the e¤ect of the negotiation protocol on the
agreement. A cooperative solution concept or a bargaining protocol can be
applied in predicting which agreement will be chosen from the set of agreeable
pro…les. When proneness to guilt is zero, the smallest agreeable set is the set
of (non-cooperative) Nash equilibria of the UG. When the proneness to guilt
is in…nite any agreement that no player can unilaterally Pareto-improve upon
is agreeable. Thus, as we increase the players’proneness to guilt from zero
to in…nite, we move from an entirely non-cooperative prediction to a largely
cooperative one. We intend to study the e¤ect of the negotiation protocol in a
follow-up paper which also presents experimental evidence of such e¤ects.
Another dimension for future research is the relaxation of the assumption
of complete information of proneness to guilt types. The choice of an optimal
agreement when information is private requires trading o¤ the own agreed payo¤
with the probability that the opponent breaches the agreement.32 On the other
hand, a dynamic setup of incomplete information on proneness to guilt would
allow for the players to build up reputations. First, it may be optimal for types
with high proneness to guilt to build up a reputation for a lower proneness to
guilt so that they are proposed higher shares of the surplus in the future. Second,
types with a low proneness to guilt may be willing to build up a reputation for
31See appendix A for further details.
32Notice yet, that if the information on proneness to guilt is private, signalling is not an
issue: the maximisation problem conditional on respecting is the same independently of the
type, and thus all types that intend to respect behave identically. Any type who intends to
breach is thus detected. Thus, her opponent knows that she will not su¤er guilt.
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a higher proneness to guilt in order to be able to reach agreements with a larger
fraction of types. From a similar perspective one can study the evolution of
proneness to guilt for a given stochastic process of games and matches.
9 Appendix
9.1 A) Repeated games
Results analogous to those in this paper would be obtained, if we suppose that
players have zero proneness to guilt and they informally agree on a station-
ary action pro…le in an in…nitely repeated game with continuous time. The
punishment paths are not negotiated, however, but they are exogenously deter-
mined (in a commonly known social contract, for instance). If the agreement is
breached players revert to mutual minmax strategies and the punishment phase
lasts for time interval k(:) and the length of the punishment depends on the
agreed payo¤ and the harm.
If such punishment paths indeed re‡ect a common sense of justice prevailing
in society, then, in one-shot games, the guilt cost might serve as an internalized
punishment that re‡ects society’s sense of justice. Psychologists such as Clark
and Mills (1979) argue for such origins of guilt.
It is easily veri…ed that to make the incentives to breach identical to that in
the single shot model, we must make the following assumptions
² discount rates are equal ½i = 1 for i = 1; 2
² It takes time w = ¡ ln(12 ) to observe that opponent is breaching.
² the punishment function k(hj(m; ai); vi(m); uPi ) takes the following form
k(hj(m;ai); vi(m); u
P
i ) = lim
"!0
¡ ln(maxf"; 1 ¡ µ g(vi(m); hj(m; si))
ui(m) ¡ uPi
g)
(with uPi the mutual minmax payo¤ for player i): Yet, this formulation,
implies that an in…nitely long punishment follows a breaching where (ui(m) ¡
uPi ) · µg(vi(m); hj(m; si)).
9.2 B) Exogenous action-norms and moral discourse
Harsanyi (1977) and Binmore (1998) present models where a social contract
is agreed upon in a moral discourse which is considered to take place prior to
the play of the grand game of life33. The social contract can be interpreted as
a collection of action-norms that apply in various circumstances in the grand
game of life. As indicated by psychological research, violating such norms causes
distress, such as guilt, shame and fear of punishment. Another stylized fact
33Similar philosophical non-game theoretic approaches are provided by Habermas (1990)
and Hoppe (1993), for instance.
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of the research in psychology is that guilt (or distress) is proportional to the
harm that violation causes on others. Thus, the approach developed here can
be applied to general action-norms as outcomes of moral discourse -pre-play
negotiations of the grand game of life.
In the game theoretic models of Harsanyi (1977) and Binmore (1998), players
have empathetic preferences which are weighted sums of individual preferences
and used in moral discourse to derive a shared perception of a fair social contract.
The fairness preferences are derived from weighting of the individual preferences
in an impartial original position where the player thinks it is equally likely
that one ends up playing one’s own role or that of the opponent. Empathetic
preferences are de…ned over the set S£f1; 2g where S is the set of action pro…les
of play and f1; 2g is the set of possible roles. A player has an ordering over the
outcomes of the game faced either as oneself or as the opponent. Full empathy
says that the ordering of S coincides with that of ui(s) for each i. This leads to
a utility function which is a weighted sum of the preferences of the two players.
If the player uses his fairness preferences when playing the game after com-
munication and considering a deviation that decreases the opponent’s pay-
o¤, the guilt cost takes the form of example 2. The formulation Ui(m; s) =
ui(s) + µivi(m)hj(m;s) is reached by letting the weight depend on the agreed
payo¤ vi(m). The implication is thus a truncated additive social welfare func-
tion where the concern for the opponent depends on how nicely one is treated
in the pre-play negotiations and how prone to guilt (empathetic) one is.
9.3 C) Proofs
9.3.1 Proof of lemma 2
mi 2 BRi(mj) , for all si, ui(mi; mj) ¸ ui(si;mj) ) for all si; ui(mi;mj) ¸
ui(si; mj) ¡ g(vi(m); hj(m; sj)) , for all si, Bi(m;si; µi) · 0. Thus, m 2
Ai(¡; µi) i¤ (IRi).
For the second claim, mi =2 BRi(mj) ) there is s0i such that ui(s0i;mj) >
ui(mi; mj). Suppose now that (ICi) holds. But, for all si, Bi(m;si; µi) ·
0 ) Bi(m; s0i; µi) · 0 ) g(vi(m); hj(m;sj)) ¸ ui(si;mj) ¡ ui(mi; mj) )
g(vi(m); hj(m;sj)) > 0 ) vi(m) > 0. Thus (IRi) holds and m 2 Ai(¡; µi):
Suppose now that m is agreeable. But, then by de…nition (ICi) holds.¥
9.3.2 Proof of proposition 3
Since m is an equilibrium vi(m) ¸ 0 for i = 1; 2: Since m is an equilibrium in
¡, , mi 2 BRi(mj) for i = 1; 2. Then, by lemma (2), m 2 Ai(¡; µi) for i = 1; 2
and, by de…nition, m 2 A(¡; µ).¥
9.3.3 Proof of lemma 4
Since both deviate from the agreement the guilt cost is zero for both. Then
for all si, Ui(m; s¤) = ui(s¤) ¸ ui(si; s¤j ) ¸ Ui(m; si; s¤j ) where the inequality
follows from the fact that s¤ is a Nash equilibrium of ¡.¥
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9.3.4 Proof of lemma 5
Conditions (AC) and (EF) imply that gi(vi(m); hj(m; si)) = 0 if hj(m;si) < 0.
But indeed, hj(m; si)
:
= uj(m) ¡ uj(mj ; si) · 0. Thus (ICi) is violated and
m =2 Ai(¡; µi) and thus m =2 A(¡; µ).¥
9.3.5 Proof of proposition 6
By assumption, vi(m) > 0 for i = 1; 2. Take player i and an arbitrary si. First, if
ui(mi; mj) ¸ ui(si;mj) then ui(mi;mj) ¸ ui(si; mj) ¡ g(vi(m); hj(m;sj)) and
Bi(m; si; µi) · 0. Second, if uj(mj; si) < uj(mj; mi) then hj(m;si) > 0. By,
(EF) g(vi(m); hj(m;si)) > 0. Thus, since payo¤s in ¡ are …nite, limµi!1 µig(vi(m);
hj(m; si)) ¸ ui(si;mj) ¡ ui(mi; mj). Hence, limµi!1 B(m;si; µi) · 0. Since ei-
ther ui(mi;mj) ¸ ui(si;mj) or uj(mj ; si) < uj(mj; mi) holds for every si, (ICi)
holds. Thus m 2 Ai(¡; µi): This is true for both players. Thus, m 2 A(¡; µ).
Let now m 2 A(¡; µ). Suppose to the contrary that there is i and si such
that neither ui(mi; mj) ¸ ui(si; mj) nor uj(mj ; si) < uj(mj ;mi) holds. Then,
both are true. But then, by lemma 5, m =2 A(¡; µ). This is a contradiction.¥
9.3.6 Proof of proposition 9
Lemma 5
Lemma 14 Let ¡ be …nite. Let mi 6= fs1i ; sni g. Let {1} , {2} and {4} hold.
Then (ICi) holds if and only if Bi(m;µi) · 0.
Proof. We will show that (ICi) does not hold i¤ Bi(m;µi) > 0.
Let Bi(m;µi) > 0. If ui(mi ¡ 1;mj) ¡ ui(mi; mj) ¸ 0, B(m;mi ¡ 1; µi) >
0 and (ICi) is violated. If ui(mi + 1;mj) ¡ ui(mi; mj) > 0, then B(m; mi +
1; µi) > 0 and (ICi) is violated.
Let (ICi) be violated. Thus, there is s0i such that Bi(m; s0i; µi) > 0. Suppose
to the contrary that Bi(m;µi) · 0. We only need to consider the case ui(mi ¡
1; mj)¡ui(mi;mj) ¸ 0 since if ui(mi+1;mj)¡ui(mi; mj) > 0, then Bi(m;µi) >
0 by de…nition.
Let thus ui(mi ¡ 1;mj) ¡ ui(mi;mj) ¸ 0. By assumption Bi · 0 and thus
ui(mi ¡ 1; mj) ¡ ui(mi; mj) · g(vi(m); hj(m;mi ¡ 1))
By assumption {1}, the harm increases in deviations further downwards. Also
by assumption {4} guilt cost is convex in hj and by assumption {2} uj is concave
in si. Thus the harm is convex in si and the guilt cost is also convex in si as
a composite of two convex functions. Thus the cost is convex in si. On the
other hand, by assumption {2} the payo¤ ui is concave in si, the bene…t from
breaching ui(si; mj) ¡ ui(mi;mj) is concave in si. Thus if Bi(m;µi) · 0 then
B(m;s; µi) · 0 for all si < mi. We have a contradiction.
Proof of the proposition The result follows directly from lemma 2, lemma
14 and the fact that A(¡; µ) = \i=1;2Ai(¡; µi)¥
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9.3.7 Proof of lemma 10
¯(mi + 1;mj) = ui(mi;mj) ¡ ui(mi + 1;mj) ¡ [ui(mi ¡ 1; mj) ¡ ui(mi;mj)
] = ¡±i(m)
¯(mi;mj + 1) = ui(mi ¡ 1;mj + 1) ¡ ui(mi; mj + 1) ¡ [ui(mi ¡ 1; mj) ¡
ui(mi; mj)] = ¡Ái(mi;mj + 1)
´j(mj; mi+1) = uj(mj ;mi+1)¡uj(mj ;mi)¡[uj(mj ;mi)¡uj(mj; mi¡1)] =
¾j(m)
Proof. ´j(mj + 1;mi) = uj(mj + 1;mi) ¡ uj(mj + 1;mi ¡ 1) ¡ [uj(mj ;mi) ¡
uj(mj ;mi ¡ 1)] = Áj(mj + 1;mi)¥
9.3.8 Proof of proposition 11
Since ui is increasing in sj , by lemma 5, we need ui to be decreasing in si for
(si; sj) to be agreeable. Then, the marginal incentive to breach writes
Bi(mi; mj) = ¯i(mi;mj) ¡ µig(ui(mi;mj); ´j(mi;mj))
But ¯i(m) is increasing in mi and ´j(m) is decreasing in mi by lemma 10. Also,
ui(mi; mj) ¡ ui(mi ¡ 1; mj) < 0 implies that ui(m) decreases in mi. But g is
increasing in both arguments. Thus, Bi(mi;mj) is indeed increasing in mi:
On the other hand, ¯i(mi;mj) is decreasing in mj and ´j(mi;mj) is increas-
ing in mj by lemma 10. Also, ui is increasing in mj by assumption. But g is
increasing in both arguments. Thus, Bi(mi;mj) is indeed decreasing in mi:¥
9.3.9 Proof of theorem 12
Since Ái(s) < 0 for all s, the best reply curves are downward sloping. Since
payo¤ functions are concave, for si < BRi(sj), ui(si +1; sj)¡ui(si; sj) > 0. For
any symmetric action pro…le such that si < s¤i , si < BRi(sj). Thus increasing
the action of i improves the payo¤ of both. Thus symmetric pro…les such that
si < s¤i are not e¢cient. Thus, If ui(s¤i +k; s¤j +k) > 0 for some k 2 Z then k > 0.
But, since Ái(s) < 0, by lemma 10, ¯i(s
¤ +k) > ¯i(s
¤) and ´(s¤ +k) < ´(s¤) for
i = 1; 2.¥
9.3.10 Proof of theorem 13
Lemmas 15 to 20
Lemma 15 If ± 6= Á then there is at most one equilibrium s¤ where ¯i(s¤) =
0 for i = 1; 2
If ¡± > Á then (si; sj ) 2 MF implies si ¸ s¤ for i = 1; 2
If ¡± < Á then (si; sj ) 2 MF implies si · s¤ for i = 1; 2
Proof. As a mapping from S2 to S1 the best reply curve of player one,
BR¡11 (m1), has slope ¡ ±Á and that of player two, BR2(m1), has slope ¡Á± which
are positive constants. The crossing point of the BR curves is a unique (sym-
metric) equilibrium, s¤ = (s¤1; s¤2). s 2 MF implies that @ui(s)@si · 0 for i = 1; 2.
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For player two this is true for m2 ¸ BR2(m1) and for player one this is true for
m2 ¸ BR¡11 (m1). Thus the claim.
Lemma 16 Let the game be symmetric. If sc maximizes maxk2Zu(s+k) where
si = sj (along the diagonal) then there is no s0 such that ui(s0) > ui(sc) for
i = 1; 2:
Such sc exists.















j) since the payo¤ is increasing in the action of the opponent. Thus
sc is e¢cient.
Since S is …nite and u(s + k) is de…ned for all k 2 Z, there must be k that
maximizes u(s + k) with si = sj and s 2 S.
Lemma 17 s =2 MF ) there is i such that ui(s + 1) > ui(s)
Proof. s =2 MF ) there is i such that ui(s + 1) ¡ ui(s) = [ui(s + 1; s + 1) ¡
ui(s; s + 1)] + [ui(s; s + 1) ¡ ui(s; s)] > 0.
Lemma 18 Let y be convex and supermodular. Then y(x + 2; z + 2) ¡ 2y(x +
1; z + 1) + y(x; z) ¸ 0
Proof. Let y be convex and supermodular. Then
y(x + 2; z + 2) ¡ y(x + 1; z + 1) ¡ [y(x + 1; z + 1) ¡ y(x; z)]
= y(x; z) ¡ y(x + 1; z) ¡ y(x + 1; z) + y(x + 2; z)
+y(x + 2; z + 2) ¡ y(x + 2; z + 1) ¡ y(x + 2; z + 1) + y(x + 2; z)
+y(x + 2; z + 1) ¡ y(x + 2; z) ¡ y(x + 1; z + 1) + y(x + 1; z)
+y(x + 2; z + 1) ¡ y(x + 2; z) ¡ y(x + 1; z + 1) + y(x + 1; z)
¸ 0
The …rst e¤ect on the RHS is the second order e¤ect of the …rst variable, the
second row is the second order e¤ect of the second variable and the remaining
two rows are identical and equal to the supermodularity e¤ect.
Lemma 19 Let ¾ + ± < 0, 2Á + ± + ¾ ¸ 0 and Á ¸ 0; ± · 0; ¾ · 0. Let
ui(s)¡ui(s¡ 1) ¸ 0 and ¯i(s¡ 1) ¸ 0. Let g satisfy {4} and {5}. Suppose that
¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ g(ui(s ¡ 1); ´j(s ¡ 1)). If ¯i(s) · g(ui(s); ´j(s)) then ¯i(s + k) ·
g(ui(s + k); ´j(s + k)) for all k > 0.
Proof. ± + 2Á + ¾ ¸ 0 and Á + ± < 0 implies that Á + ¾ ¸ 0: Then, by lemma
10, ¯(s+k) is increasing and concave in k and ´(s+k) is increasing and convex
in k.
Since ± + 2Á + ¾ ¸ 0 and ui(s) ¡ ui(s ¡ 1) ¸ 0, u(s + k) is convex and
increasing in k for k ¸ 0. Thus, g(u(s + k); ´(s)) is convex and increasing in
k since g is convex and increasing in u by {5}. Similarly, g(u(s); ´(s + k)) is
convex and increasing in k since g is convex in ´ for ´ ¸ 0 by {4}.
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Also since ¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ g(ui(s ¡ 1); ´j(s ¡ 1)) and ¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ 0 but ¯i(s) ·
g(ui(s); ´j(s)), we have
¯(s) ¡ ¯(s ¡ 1)
· g(u(s); ´(s)) ¡ g(u(s ¡ 1); ´(s ¡ 1))
Thus, by lemma 18 and since g is supermodular in its arguments
0 · ¯(s + 1) ¡ ¯(s)
= ¡± ¡ Á
= ¯(s) ¡ ¯(s ¡ 1)
· g(u(s); ´(s)) ¡ g(u(s ¡ 1); ´(s ¡ 1))
· g(u(s + 1); ´(s + 1)) ¡ g(u(s); ´(s))
We can proceed by induction to show that for every s + k with k > 0, we
have ¯(s+k)¡g(u(s+k); ´(s+k)) · ¯(s)¡g(u(s); ´(s)) · 0: Above, we showed
that ui(s + k) > u(s) for k > 0. Thus every s + k with k > 0 is agreeable.
Lemma 20 Let ¾ + ± < 0, Á + ¾ ¸ 0 and Á ¸ 0; ± · 0; ¾ · 0. Let ¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸
0. Let g satisfy {4} and let g(u0; ´) = g(u; ´) for all u0; u; ´. Suppose that
¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ g(ui(s ¡ 1); ´j(s ¡ 1)). If ¯i(s) · g(ui(s); ´j(s)) then ¯i(s + k) ·
g(ui(s + k); ´j(s + k)) for all k > 0.
Proof. By lemma 10, ¯(s + k) is increasing and concave in k and ´(s + k) is
increasing and convex in k.
Also g(u(s); ´(s+ k)) is convex and increasing in k since g is convex in ´ for
´ ¸ 0 by {4} and for all u; g(u; ´(s+k)) = g(u(s+k); ´(s+k)) by assumption.
Also since ¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ g(ui(s ¡ 1); ´j(s ¡ 1)) and ¯i(s ¡ 1) ¸ 0 but ¯i(s) ·
g(ui(s); ´j(s)), we have
¯(s) ¡ ¯(s ¡ 1)
· g(u(s); ´(s)) ¡ g(u(s ¡ 1); ´(s ¡ 1))
Thus, since g(u(s); ´(s + k)) is convex and increasing in k
0 · ¯(s + 1) ¡ ¯(s)
= ¡± ¡ Á
= ¯(s) ¡ ¯(s ¡ 1)
· g(u(s); ´(s)) ¡ g(u(s ¡ 1); ´(s ¡ 1))
= g(u(s + 1); ´(s)) ¡ g(u(s); ´(s ¡ 1))
· g(u(s + 1); ´(s + 1)) ¡ g(u(s); ´(s))
We can proceed by induction to show that for every s + k with k > 0, we
have ¯(s + k) ¡ g(u(s + k); ´(s + k)) · ¯(s) ¡ g(u(s); ´(s)) · 0: Thus every
s + k with k > 0 is agreeable.
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Proposition 21 Let ± + 2Á+ ¾ ¸ 0. Let s0 ¡ 1 2 MF and s0 ¡ 1 =2 A(¡; µ): Let
u(s0)¡ u(s0 ¡ 1) ¸ 0: Let s¤ be the unique equilibrium of the game and ¯i(s¤) =
0. Suppose that {1}, {2}, and {3} hold. Furthermore, let g satisfy {4}, and {5}.
If s0 such that s0i > s
¤
i is agreeable then any s
0 + k such that k > 0 is agreeable.
Proof. ± + 2Á + ¾ ¸ 0 implies that Á + ± ¸ 0 or ¾ + Á ¸ Á: Suppose …rst that
± + Á > 0. By lemma 15 s0i ¡ 1 < s¤i for i = 1; 2. Thus s0i · s¤i and the claim
holds trivially.
Let now, Á + ± = 0. Then ¯(s + 1) ¡ ¯(s) = 0 and either there are multiple
equilibria or in the unique equilibrium there is i such that ¯i(s
¤) 6= 0 both
contrary to our assumptions.
Let now, Á+ ± < 0. Then ¾ +Á > 0. The fact that s0 ¡ 1 2 MF implies that
¯(s0 ¡ 1) ¸ 0. By lemma 10, ¯(s + 1) ¡ ¯(s) = ¡± ¡Á > 0. Also, since Á > ¡¾,
by lemma 10 ´(s+ 1)¡ ´(s) = ¾ + Á > 0 and thus ´(s +k) is weakly increasing
in k.
On the one hand, u(s0+1)¡u(s0) ¸ u(s0)¡u(s0 ¡1) ¸ 0 since ¾+2Á+± > 0.
On the other hand, u(s0) ¸ u¤ since s0 is agreeable.
Since u(s + k) is convex in k, then g(u(s + k); ´(s)) is convex in k since
g is convex in u. Similarly, g(u(s); ´(s + k)) is convex and increasing in k for
k ¸ 0 since g is convex and increasing in ´ for ´ ¸ 0 and ´(s + k) is convex and
increasing in k for k ¸ 0.
Also s0 ¡ 1 2 MF and since s0 ¡ 1 =2 A(¡; µ) we have ¯i(s0 ¡ 1) > 0 and
¯i(s
0¡1)¡g(ui(s0¡1); ´j(s0¡1)) > 0. But s0 2 A(¡; µ), and ¯i(s0) ¸ ¯i(s0¡1) >
0. Thus, by lemma 19 every, s0 + k with k > 0 is agreeable.
Proof of the theorem By proposition 3; s¤ is agreeable as a Nash equilibrium
of the underlying game. Thus ’=)’is trivial.
Let us now show that if a symmetric s 6= s¤ is agreeable;then an e¢cient
symmetric s is agreeable.
If Á + ± ¸ 0 then since the game is symmetric and there is an ine¢cient
equilibrium such that ¯i(s
¤) = 0, (sn1 ; sn2 ) is an equilibrium. To see this consider
two subcases, 1) Á + ± > 0 and 2) Á + ± = 0. If Á + ± > 0, since Á > 0, the best
reply correspondences are upward sloping and steeper than one and they cross
at s¤. By symmetry (sn1 ; sn2 ) is an equilibrium, since ¡¯i(sn) > 0 for i = 1; 2.
If Á + ± = 0 and there is s¤ such that ¯i(s¤) = 0 for i = 1; 2, then both best
reply functions have a slope equal to one and they overlap in the entire strategy
space. All symmetric pro…les are equilibria and thus (sn1 ; s
n
2 ) is an equilibrium.
In both cases, since ui is increasing in sj , by theorem 7 in Milgrom, Roberts
(1990), (sn1 ; s
n




2 ) is agreeable.
Suppose now that Á+± < 0. Then if ¾ +±+2Á ¸ 0, we must have ¾+Á > 0.
Since ¾ + ± + 2Á ¸ 0 and ¯i(s¤) = 0 for i = 1; 2, (sn1 ; sn2 ) is e¢cient. To see
this, …rst consider pro…les s¤ ¡ k for k > 0. By lemma 15, s¤ ¡ k =2 MF . By
lemma 17, there is i such that ui(s¤ ¡ k + 1) ¡ ui(s¤ ¡ k) > 0. Since the game
is symmetric, this holds for both players. But since ¾ + ± + 2Á ¸ 0, ui(s + k) is
convex in k. Thus, ui(s + k) > ui(s) for i = 1; 2 for all symmetric s and for all
37
k > 0. Thus, (sn1 ; s
n
2 ) maximizes the payo¤ along the diagonal. Thus, by lemma
16; (sn1 ; s
n
2 ) is e¢cient.
Let Á + ± < 0 still hold and suppose alternatively that ¾ + ± + 2Á < 0.
Then ui(s+k) is strictly concave in k. By lemma 17 and by symmetry, ui(s¤) >
ui(s¤¡1) for i = 1; 2. Since the strategy set is bounded a maximizer s¤ +k along
the diagonal exists and it satis…es k > 0.
Since asymmetric s 6= s¤ is agreeable, by lemma 15, s = s¤ + k for some
k > 0. For each player, consider two subcases, 1) there is 1 < k0 < k such that
s¤+k0¡1 =2 Ai(¡; µi) but s¤+k0 2 A(¡; µ) and 2) s¤+k0 where k0 = 1 is agreeable.
It is easy to see that one of the two must hold for each player. In either case the
agreeability of s¤ +k0 implies that ¯i(s¤ +k0) · gi(u(s¤ +k0); ´j(s¤ +k0)) and in
each subcase ¯i(s
¤ +k0 ¡ 1) ¸ 0 and ¯i(s¤ + k0 ¡ 1) ¸ gi(u(s¤ + k0 ¡ 1); ´j(s¤ +
k0 ¡ 1)). Thus, if ¾ + ± +2Á ¸ 0 and g satis…es {5} we can apply lemma 19. On
the other hand, if Á + ¾ ¸ 0 and g(u0; ´) = g(u; ´) for all u0; u; ´, we can apply
lemma 20. In either case any s¤ + k with k ¸ k0 is agreeable: Thus an e¢cient
symmetric pro…le is agreeable.¥
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